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NARRATIVES OF SELF GOVERNMENT IN 
MAKING THE CASE  
Benjamin L. Berger* 
This is a book about persuasion. In Making the Case: The 
Art of the Judicial Opinion,1 Paul Kahn draws the judicial 
opinion into the centre of our field of vision and invites us to 
join him in inquiring into the role that it plays shaping our legal 
and political communities, and in seeking to understand how it 
does its work. Ultimately, he shows that persuasion is at the 
heart of the judicial opinion and, with that, at the heart of the 
rule of law. 
The persuasion at stake in Kahn’s book is not, however, 
what you might expect. Central to this insightful, creative study 
is the idea that the burden faced by the judge is not—or not 
chiefly—to persuade the parties that the court has reached the 
correct outcome; it is, rather, to persuade us all that the law is 
our own. The judicial opinion is “a form of rhetorical address 
performing the broadly political task of maintaining belief in 
 
*Professor and Associate Dean (Students), Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 
Toronto. I am grateful to Kate Glover for her comments on drafts of this review and to 
Jamie Shilton for his excellent research assistance. 
1. PAUL W. KAHN, MAKING THE CASE: THE ART OF THE JUDICIAL OPINION (2016). 
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self-government through law.”2 It is, in other words, a 
persuasive act aimed at sustaining belief in a particular kind of 
political community. Making the Case explains the character of 
this persuasive task and the rhetorical techniques and devices 
available in pursuing it. Kahn offers a schematic of the location 
and inner workings of the judicial opinion within the 
imaginative architecture of our political beliefs. Seeing that 
picture, we are equipped to be better readers (and, in the case of 
judges, also better writers) of the judicial opinion. 
Kahn has established himself as a preeminent guide to the 
shape and structure of our modern political and legal 
imaginations. The diversity amongst his books—ranging from 
in-depth studies of U.S. constitutional moments to 
reexaminations of classic philosophical texts, exercises in 
biblical interpretation, and studies of modern liberalism3—belies 
the tight unity of his concern. Across his work, Kahn is 
interested in the genealogy and architecture of the beliefs and 
practices that sustain our political lives, lives in which the 
culture of law’s rule plays a central role. Like Geertz and 
Weber, he is interested in the “webs of significance”4 in which 
we are suspended and through which we make sense of our 
experiences. 
We can find that web of meanings at work in any of our 
cultural artefacts—the sense that we make of our lives is not 
episodic or domain-specific. And so, in Finding Ourselves at the 
Movies,5 Kahn examines the modern movie as a particular text 
in which to find and explore questions of law, love, and 
sacrifice, and how they work within our political imaginations. 
He shows in that book that the movie is successful to the extent 
that it participates effectively in the narratives that structure how 
we understand ourselves and our communities. In Making the 
Case Kahn turns his attention to a different cultural artefact, this 
 
2. Id. at xiv (footnote omitted). 
3. See PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA (1997); PAUL W. KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW 
CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (2011); PAUL W. KAHN, OUT OF EDEN: 
ADAM AND EVE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL (2006); PAUL W. KAHN, PUTTING 
LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE (2004). 
4. See, e.g., CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 5 (1973).  
5. PAUL W. KAHN, FINDING OURSELVES AT THE MOVIES: PHILOSOPHY FOR A NEW 
GENERATION (2013). 
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one central to the world of the law: the judicial opinion. The text 
is different but the project is very similar. 
In Making the Case, Kahn seeks to understand the judicial 
opinion as a rhetorical act that succeeds to the extent that it 
“persuades us to see the situation in light of one of the broad 
narrative accounts by which we regularly give order to our 
social and political life.”6 As he puts it, “the rule of law is a way 
of seeing and maintaining our common social world”;7 that 
burden of depiction and maintenance, Kahn argues, falls to the 
judicial opinion, and so we must understand better what 
precisely it seeks to do and how it works. 
This is where Making the Case begins: with a desire to read 
the judicial opinion more sensitively and to understand better 
how it does its work as a persuasive text. In this, Kahn sees 
himself as recovering the “original promise of the casebook 
method”8—immersing the reader in the interplay of fact and law 
in order to see how an opinion seeks to persuade. Kahn intends 
the audience of Making the Case to be, in part, students coming 
to the law for the first time, seeking to learn how to read a 
judicial opinion. And to be sure, talented students will gather a 
great deal from this book. But Kahn also notes the tradition of 
academic writing on law “in which an introductory work is no 
less a serious work on law”9 and Making the Case is certainly 
that. The audience for this book is, in fact, complex. It is 
illuminating and important reading for lawyers, whom Kahn 
describes as the key audience of the judicial opinion; for law 
teachers interested in legal pedagogy; for judges who seek to 
better understand their judicial role and the “art of the judicial 
opinion”; and for scholars interested in political and legal 
theory. The book provokes ideas about legal pedagogy, could 
serve as something of a manual for successful opinion-writing, 
and makes serious and fresh interventions into fundamental 
questions of political philosophy. The breadth of the audience to 
which this text successfully appeals is one of its achievements. 
Following a useful preface directed at students “with a 
Note to Everyone Else,” Kahn embarks on his project of 
 
6. KAHN, supra note 1, at 19. 
7. Id. at 12. 
8. Id. at ix. 
9. Id. at xiii (noting Karl Llewellyn’s THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1930), amongst others). 
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drawing out the nature, burdens, and resources of the judicial 
opinion. The richness of this small book rewards careful reading 
but precludes an exhaustive account of Kahn’s argument and 
insights. Rather than attempting such an account, I focus in the 
balance of this review on what I take to be the core conceptual 
contribution of Kahn’s account of the judicial opinion: the link 
between narrative, persuasion, and self-government. 
 
* * * 
 
The decisive methodological move in Making the Case is 
Kahn’s approach to the judicial opinion as a unique literary 
genre. In Chapter 1, he circumscribes his subject in a way that 
creates space for this distinctive and profitable framing of the 
opinion. He distinguishes the judicial opinion from other legal 
texts like statutes and regulations by observing that it seeks to 
persuade, not solely to command: “Only here,” Kahn explains, 
“does law link command to explanation.”10 His interest is thus 
not in the court’s judgment but rather in the judicial opinion, 
which is an explanatory, rhetorical exercise;11 in his terms, what 
matters in the opinion is not principally “vote” but “voice.” 
Yet he also makes distance on approaches that would 
understand the opinion chiefly as an artefact of dispute 
resolution, aimed at convincing the losing party. 
Central to this book is the idea that every judicial opinion—
quite irrespective of the topic of law that it treats—is 
fundamentally public in character, in that it is not only the 
parties who are owed an explanation, but rather “we all are, for 
the opinion is a public act setting forth the meaning of law for 
everyone.”12 “An appellate court opinion explains the law to 
those who are to live under it.”13 The formulation “are to” in this 
sentence is key. That we will live under the law is not to be 
taken for granted in the judicial opinion, such that Kahn could 
write simply that the opinion explains the law “to those who live 
under it”; there is a task to complete in each judicial opinion, a 
 
10. Id. at 1. 
11. As Kahn explains at one point, “you must look beyond the judgment to the opinion, 
for only then can you come to understand how courts construct an entire world of 
meaning.” Id. at 10. 
12. Id. at 1. 
13. Id. at 5. 
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burden that must be discharged through the text if the future of 
living under the law (in the way that we find politically 
acceptable) is to remain possible. We must be persuaded by the 
text, and that persuasion turns on the judge’s ability to appeal in 
the right way to the imagination of the audience, which is all of 
us. This framing prepares the way for approaching the judicial 
opinion as a literary genre, a move that gives Kahn analytic tools 
unavailable to the doctrinalist, who is more narrowly interested 
in the outcomes of legal disputes, or to the crit, whose turn away 
from credulity about doctrine leads to viewing the language of 
an opinion as mere rhetoric in service of ideology. Neither 
framing reflects Kahn’s literary approach in which story and 
imagination are key and in which the judicial opinion is a 
creative production. Two analytic tools afforded by this 
approach—narrative and voice—yield the core insights of this 
book.14 
The pivotal role of narrative in the judicial opinion is laid 
out in Chapter 2. For Kahn the opinion is, at core, “an effort to 
persuade us that a particular way of seeing the situation makes 
sense.”15 Successful opinions do so, and the judge has two sets 
of resources at hand to achieve this persuasive task. First, the 
judge must provide an account of the facts and the law. Chapters 
4 and 5 of Making the Case offer a thoughtful taxonomy of the 
moves available to judges in framing the facts and relating them 
to the law, a discussion that I commend to law students, lawyers, 
and judges. The central theme in those chapters is an important 
but more familiar message about the interdependency of fact and 
law: we don’t know what the salient facts are without knowing 
the legal issue, and it is impossible to identify the relevant law 
without first having made decisions about the way in which to 
frame the facts. But the central conceptual contributions of this 
book do not flow from this first set of resources, but rather from 
the second: the appeal to narratives. 
Kahn notes that the weaving together of fact and law must 
yield an account that seems sensible to us, and that it will appear 
 
14. In this respect, Making the Case has an analytical affinity to critical literary works; 
reading this text, I was put in mind of the resonances with the work of the cultural and 
literary theorist Mieke Bal, in NARRATOLOGY: INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF 
NARRATIVE (1997). Making the Case is a kind of narratology for the judicial opinion.  
15. KAHN, supra note 1, at 16. 
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so only “if the opinion persuades us to see the situation in light 
of one of the broad narrative accounts by which we regularly 
give order to our social and political life.”16 Appealing to the 
literary sources that so inform the book, Kahn observes that, as 
in a short story, in the judicial opinion “[w]e are introduced to 
actors confronting a problem” and “[i]n the course of the 
opinion, that problem must be resolved in a way that leaves us 
with a sense of order, a sense that the problem has been resolved 
fairly.”17 But from where does that “sense of order” arise? Kahn 
explains that we feel this order when we are able to see through 
the facts and law of the particular case to broad narratives—
larger themes—that we are accustomed to using in making sense 
of our personal and political experiences. To succeed, the 
opinion must appeal to these broad narratives; it must “present 
the particular case as an instance of a more general narrative 
that is already familiar to readers.”18 The sanctity of privacy, 
the imperative of equality, the good of freedom; but also 
personal narratives about family, friendship, love, and care: 
these are the organizing narratives that we habitually use to 
make sense of our personal and political experiences and to 
which the judicial opinion must appeal if it is to persuade.19 
Otherwise put, the opinion must connect the case to our pasts, 
our imagined futures, ourselves—to our identities. Thus, Kahn 
explains that “[t]he opinion persuades us when we come to see 
the situation as making sense in light of these large, organizing 
ideas that have already structured our understanding of ourselves 
and our communities.”20 In seeking to persuade us, the opinion 
trades in these narratives to “[offer] us representations that we 
recognize as familiar and, more importantly, as true.”21 
Seeing them within Kahn’s frame, we understand features 
of the judicial craft and the character of the judicial opinion in 
new ways. The dissenting opinion, for example, looks very 
different when this need to appeal to narratives is foregrounded. 
 
16. Id. at 19. 
17. Id. at 20. 
18. Id. at 21 (emphasis added). 
19. Kahn names some of these broader narratives, but observes that “there is no list and 
there are no sharp boundaries” here between the political and the personal. Id. at 22. 
20. Id.  
21. Id. at 34. 
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The fundamental difference between a majority opinion and a 
dissent is often found in the narrative offered to make sense of 
the case, not in a raw dispute about the facts or the available 
doctrine. But Kahn explains that dissenting opinions are not 
rejecting the majority’s narrative as unappealing—such 
narratives are too deep and central to reject. Rather, the dissent 
is offering an alternative narrative, “to which we are also 
sympathetic,”22 that purports to make better sense of the 
situation by better capturing who we think we are as a political 
community. With this, Kahn exposes the drama at the heart of 
the judicial opinion, the essential drama that draws our interest 
as lawyers, judges, and scholars, and to which—if we do our 
jobs ably as teachers—we connect our students: judges struggle 
to appeal to these core narratives and hope that their opinions 
will persuade. And what will ultimately persuade? The answer 
to that question is simultaneously an answer to the question 
“Who are we?” As Kahn puts it, “[r]ead as a competition to 
persuade the reader, there is genuine excitement in the 
opinions.”23 
In this respect, Kahn affirms the political character of the 
judiciary, but he means by this something quite different than do 
those writing from a realist or crit perspective concerned with 
the individual or institutional ideologies or preferences 
expressed through judges’ decisions. For Kahn, the attempt to 
persuade through the judicial opinion involves the presentation 
of a narrative that appeals to and seeks to order the complex and 
contradictory values of a community in the best, most 
convincing way. And “[i]f we think of politics as the domain 
within which we collectively give order to the multiple values 
circulating in our community, then the judiciary is a deeply 
political institution.”24 
Narrative thus plays a key role in Kahn’s exposition of the 
judicial opinion: the opinion persuades when it successfully 
situates the case within a fundamental narrative that reflects our 
understanding of ourselves as a political community. We must 
be persuaded to see ourselves in the opinion. But this leaves us 
 
22. Id. at 27. 
23. Id. at 33. 
24. Id. at 38 (footnote omitted). 
BERGERPERSONAL (DO NOT DELETE)  12/1/2017 4:53 PM 
96 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS 
with a crucial question: Why is it essential that an opinion so 
persuades us? 
This is where Kahn turns to the question of voice and, in 
exploring it, offers the most piercing and creative theoretical 
insights of the book. If Chapter 2 is about the importance of 
what a judicial opinion says, Chapter 3 is about the importance 
of who we hear saying it. This is the issue of voice in the 
opinion. The central conundrum around which this chapter is 
built is this: Why would we accept the authority of the courts to 
do the work described in Chapter 2? This is the question of the 
legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking. The reader would be 
forgiven for being skeptical that something new and fresh could 
be offered here. But Kahn strides past the abundant literature 
that seeks to address this question with variations on appeals to 
trust or truth and, instead, looks for the ground of judicial 
legitimacy and authority in the narrative voice of the opinion.  
The arc of Kahn’s argument is set by his observation that a 
central tenet of our political imaginations is that “[w]e want our 
laws not only to be just but to be our own.”25 Our commitment 
to the rule of law is accompanied by this commitment to self-
government: that the laws do not happen to us, but rather that 
they belong to us in some strong sense, and that we are 
responsible for them. Yet we don’t vote on all of our laws, 
including the fundamental law of our constitution, and so we are 
met with the question: How do we sustain this sense that the 
laws are our own?  
 Kahn explains that “[t]he sense that the law is our own 
rests on a set of beliefs about authorship.”26 This is the question 
of voice: Who do we hear when we read a text? The author of a 
text is not the same as the drafter or writer. The writer is the 
cause of the text, whereas it is the author that we hold 
accountable or responsible for it. “Authorship,” in this sense, is 
“a social practice of accountability.”27 The authority of the text, 
 
25. Id. at 49. 
26. Id. at 50. 
27. Id. Kahn uses familiar examples to illustrate this point about the distinction between 
the writer and the author, and the way in which it turns on this “social practice of 
accountability”: 
[I]t is not acceptable for a professor to blame his research assistant when 
problems emerge with a published text that the assistant drafted. Similarly, a 
judge cannot blame her law clerk for what an opinion says. The clerk may have 
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in turn, depends on who is accountable for it. With this, Kahn 
moves from authorship through to authority. And, given our 
political commitment to self-government, we must understand 
ourselves to be the author of a legal text if it is to have authority 
and legitimacy. In a resonant statement from which the rest of 
this book conceptually ripples out, Kahn explains that “[a]n 
important part of the work of a legal text in a democracy, then, 
is to persuade us that we are its authors. Self-government begins 
here, rather than with the vote.”28 Nestled as it is within such a 
rich text, the significance of that statement could be missed. 
Kahn is arguing that the vote is not the ground of democracy 
but, rather, one expression of a more fundamental commitment 
in the architecture of democratic political imagination: that we 
are the authors of—and therefore accountable for—the laws by 
which we live.  
This is true, Kahn explains, of a constitution: “[O]ur 
political relationship to the Constitution is not constituted in the 
first instance by its justice or efficiency. Rather, that relationship 
arises out of beliefs about authorship.”29 The point at which we 
cease to see the Constitution as our own is the point at which it 
ceases to have true authority and legitimacy, even if it retains its 
force. This is also true of legislation: “[w]e must see through the 
regulation to the statute and through the statute to its author, 
who is us.”30 And his inquiry into voice reveals that this is also 
true of the judicial opinion. Kahn concedes that placing self-
authorship at the ground of authority and legitimacy is not a new 
idea in political and legal theory. What is new here is asking 
“how the judicial opinion contributes to our social practices of 
reading the legal order as a product of our own authorship.”31 
The judicial opinion is, thus, successful when we are able 
to see ourselves as its authors—when we receive it as an 
expression of the will of the self-governing people. This is why 
it is so important that we see our way of understanding ourselves 
 
drafted the opinion, but he is not the author. He is not the author even if he wrote 
every word of the opinion. No one wants to know what the clerk thought when 
he drafted this text.  
Id. (footnote omitted). 
28. Id. at 58 (emphasis added). 
29. Id. at 55. 
30. Id. at 56 (footnote omitted). 
31. Id. at 62. 
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and our political community in the narratives of the judicial 
opinion. This is, for Kahn, the ultimate persuasive burden of the 
judicial opinion: to convince us that we hear our own voice, not 
the voice of the court or the judge. The authority and legitimacy 
of the judicial opinion rest on the judge’s success in establishing 
this voice. The opinion should in consequence be read as “a sort 
of draft that gains legitimacy when we imagine its author as the 
people themselves acting as the popular sovereign.”32 The 
successful discharge of this persuasive task—not trust or truth—
must be the ground of legitimacy for the judicial opinion if we 
are to maintain fidelity to the core imaginative commitment that 
we are engaged in a project of self-government. Kahn 
summarizes his central claim:  
The opinion, accordingly, is persuasive just to the degree 
that it does not appear at all. As soon as we see the opinion 
as the authored act of the Justices, we will ask with what 
authority they rule in our democratic policy. There is no 
answer to that question, for they have no such authority.33 
 
Understanding this, listening for that voice, we are truly reading 
the opinion: “[i]f you are counting votes, then you are not 
reading.”34 The judge’s burden, then, is to persuade us to hear 
the opinion as an expression of the reach and character of 
democratic will, reading through the opinion to the people 
themselves. “There is no other measure of legitimacy.”35  
With this, Kahn explains, “[w]e are at the imaginative 
foundation of the whole fabric that is the American idea of the 
rule of law. The opinion of the Court is nothing less than the 
opinion of the people.”36 Drawing from Weber, Kahn explains 
that judges thus exercise a “charismatic” function, maintaining 
the link between the legal order and the “transcendent authority 
of the people,”37 the link between the profane and the sacred. To 
the extent that the judicial opinion is successful in establishing 
that relationship of immanence, “we solve the puzzle of how 
 
32. Id. at 51. 
33. Id. at 69. 
34. Id. at 71. 
35. Id. at 72. 
36. Id.  
37. Id. at 84. 
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popular sovereignty and the rule of law can be one and the 
same.”38 
How precisely does this happen? Kahn uses Marbury v. 
Madison39 to explore the answer to this question, and he offers 
principles that would have to guide the interpretation of a statute 
to meet this persuasive demand.40 But ultimately he concedes 
that “[i]f all of this seems mysterious, it is because it is. It is a 
matter of faith and belief, of rituals that maintain that faith, and 
of rhetoric that gives it expression.”41 
The student, lawyer, or judge who reads this book must not 
view this ultimate turn to mystery and faith as a failure of 
precision or as somehow opaque. It is, rather, the true expression 
of an approach to law that understands it as a world of beliefs 
and practices that create and shape political communities, and of 
a book that seeks to understand the judicial opinion as a text that 
helps to sustain that imaginative world.  
 
* * * 
 
In the preface to Making the Case, Kahn describes “a 
successful reading as getting the opinion to sing. There is music 
in the law,” he explains, “and its audience is the well-trained 
lawyer. Unless you have a trained ear, you will not hear the 
melody.”42 Kahn sets out to train our ears, to help us listen to the 
music of the opinion; in this, he succeeds marvelously, and in 
exciting and revealing ways. The recurring melody—perhaps the 
leitmotif—common to all opinions is the pursuit of that essential 
persuasive objective through the use of narrative and voice: the 
core burden of convincing us to see and hear through the 
judicial opinion to ourselves. We need to hear this melody if we 
are to hold together the rule of law with our commitment to self-
government. I have therefore focused this review on Kahn’s 
 
38. Id. at 85. 
39. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
40. The question of how the interpretation and development of common law rules 
enables them to acquire legitimacy is one that Kahn does not treat in this text. This is of 
course an interesting question: Can true common law rules—those independent of statutory 
or constitutional footing—satisfy the conditions of democratic legitimacy that Kahn so 
convincingly sets out?  
41. KAHN, supra note 1, at 86. 
42. Id. at xiii. 
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exploration of narrative and voice in Chapters 2 and 3, but there 
is much more in this book that rewards the engaged reader.  
In Chapters 4 and 5 Kahn brings us closer to the key 
instruments at play in the judicial opinion—doctrine and fact—
and offers an insightful account of the moves available to the 
judge as she works with each in service of the ultimate 
persuasive task. In these chapters, the student, lawyer, or judge 
is given a detailed picture of how doctrine and the presentation 
of fact can work within the opinion, and how fact and law are 
constantly interwoven. In Chapter 4 Kahn maps the “horizontal 
and vertical” axes along which judges can move as they relate to 
prior decisions, the horizontal representing the engagement with 
past judicial decisionmaking and the vertical marking the move 
outside the jurisprudence to rely on non-judicial interpretive aids 
and authorities. “These two dimensions,” Kahn explains, 
“provide the basic argumentative tools for the doctrinal positions 
of a judicial opinion.”43 Kahn explores “the life of doctrine” in 
the judicial opinion, showing that, moving along these two 
interpretive dimensions, judges have three strategies available in 
relation to past doctrine: to incrementally develop the doctrine 
(“erudition”), to make a new doctrinal beginning (“natality”); or 
to tear down an existing line of doctrine, often in an asserted 
return to authoritative text (“destruction/fundamentalism”).44 
Using prominent examples, Kahn’s exposition of these doctrinal 
moves offers a fresh and helpful perspective from which to 
understand the argumentative structure of the opinion.  
In his discussion of the use and role of facts, Kahn’s 
emphasis is on the reciprocal relationship between facts and law, 
and on the “decisive importance of establishing context.”45 Facts 
are not merely presented—a decision always sits behind the 
narrative of the facts, a decision about the legal and normative 
horizon against which we are asked to view these facts. 
Although he does not describe his analysis as such, an evidence 
lawyer will recognize this discussion as, in essence, an 
exposition of the fundamental role of relevance in all parts of the 
judicial opinion. What Kahn describes as context could well 
 
43. Id. at 97. 
44. Id. at 108–33 (discussing all three). 
45. Id. at 140 (introducing his analysis of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579 (1952)). 
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serve as a definition of legal relevance: “We need to know 
something about where we are going legally if we are to make 
decisions about where to begin factually.”46 But just as fact 
depends on law, the successful presentation of the facts—a 
narration of the facts that “convinces us that this is the way the 
world is”47—can create a sense of the inexorable reasonableness 
of a legal conclusion. Insisting throughout on this irrepressible 
interrelationship between fact and law, Kahn engages with cases 
like Roe v. Wade48 and Gonzales v. Carhart49 to explore 
questions like the role of analogy and empathy in factual 
reasoning and the difference between legal and scientific fact. 
The latter discussion brings us back to the principal melody of 
the book. Kahn explains that legal facts will always seem 
deficient from a scientific perspective, but that this is not a 
failing of the law. Rather, it reflects the truth that “[o]ur law is 
not a science but a practice of self-government through 
persuasion.”50 
Making the Case is thick with both theoretical insights and 
practical lessons about reading and understanding the judicial 
opinion that flow from those theoretical starting points. In this, it 
presents itself as a general inquiry into “the art of the judicial 
opinion.” And yet Kahn draws examples exclusively from the 
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court and leans 
heavily on framings of popular sovereignty (“We the People,” 
for example) that ring in a distinctively American constitutional 
and political register. This is far from a criticism of Kahn’s 
approach. Quite the contrary: throughout his work, Kahn has 
urged that the culture of law’s rule is importantly particular, not 
universal. Legal imaginations are tied to specific political 
genealogies and Kahn—despite his keen interest in how the 
beliefs and rituals of the culture of law’s rule shift and change 
across political communities—is careful to work within the 
culture and history that he knows best. Nevertheless, the 
particularity of this book raises a question: How tied to the 
United States are its insights and lessons? This is a question that 
 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 155. 
48. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
49. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
50. Id. at 169. 
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comes naturally to a Canadian academic, particularly one who 
has been conscious of his use of “we” and “our” throughout this 
review. 
In my view, Making the Case has more reach than might be 
suggested on the face of the text. The reason is simple: the 
persuasive burden at the heart of the judicial opinion is and must 
be common across legal orders, to the extent that they 
understand themselves to be engaged in a project of self-
government. Much will shift from culture to culture. The broad 
narratives that resonate, the values that an opinion must order, 
the communities that must hear themselves in the opinion—all 
will vary. That which persuades is particular. Indeed, a 
fascinating way into comparative constitutionalism is to ask the 
question “what persuades here?”51 But the burden to persuade in 
the specific way that Kahn exposes as the heart of the judicial 
opinion, as well as the need to do certain kinds of work with fact 
and law, is, in my view, a feature of modern law in a 
constitutional democracy. Having read Making the Case, I have 
difficulty imagining how it could be otherwise. Judges, lawyers, 
academics, and students outside the United States will better 
understand not only the judicial opinion, but their own 
constitutional cultures, after a careful encounter with this book.  
Early in this review I reflected on the complexity of the 
audience for Making the Case, a complexity that flows from the 
fact that this book is at once a guide to reading the judicial 
opinion and a philosophical intervention on the subject of self-
government and the rule of law. Packed with insight in both 
dimensions, the book will challenge and reward the law student, 
the lawyer, the judge, and the scholar curious about the unique 
place of the judicial opinion in the practical and imaginative 
architecture of our legal and political worlds. 
But the book ends with an address to another audience: a 
cri de cœur to the humanist scholar of law . . . and we should 
listen. Kahn notes the force of social-scientific inquiry—and, in 
particular, of economics—in the study of law and, with it, the 
 
51. I make a similar claim in Benjamin L. Berger, Children of Two Logics: A Way into 
Canadian Constitutional Culture, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 319 (2013), in which I argue that 
“the study of comparative constitutional cultures should be keenly interested in those 
points in the constitutional life of a country at which the claims of the particular persist in 
spite of the logic of the universal.” Id. at 337–38. 
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scholarly focus on efficiency, on the effect of laws on social 
behavior, and on prescriptions about what the law should be. He 
urges the humanist to take up the mantle of her discipline and to 
pursue the very different lessons and insights that it can yield. 
“For the humanist,” Kahn explains, “the problem of 
understanding law is not that of deciding what the law should be 
but of explaining how we actually live with the law we have 
even as we argue with each other about what the law means.”52 
Although the social scientist can no doubt offer useful 
information about law, there are some matters—and the 
persuasive task at the heart of the judicial opinion is one—for 
which we need the tools of the humanities. If we wish to 
understand the meaning of our legal and political practices and 
experiences, we need the tools of literary and philosophical 
inquiry. The humanist, whose task is fundamentally interpretive 
and phenomenological,53 “approaches the legal imagination as 
the source of a way of understanding oneself and one’s world 
that is fundamentally built around a collective subject’s 
history.”54 And with this, Making the Case ends by pointing to 
the uniting feature of Kahn’s scholarship. As one of our guiding 
voices in the humanistic study of the culture of law’s rule, his 
objective here the same as it is in all of his work: to help us to 





52. KAHN, supra note 1, at 175 (footnote omitted). 
53. Kahn explains that the humanist “approaches law as an imagined world and asks 
how events, persons, and institutions appear in that world.” Id. at 177. In sympathetic 
tones, I explore the nature of a phenomenological approach to legal scholarship in the 
specific field of law and religion in LAW’S RELIGION: RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCE AND THE 
CLAIMS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM (2015). 
54. KAHN, supra note 1, at 174. 
